effective political creatures, disrupt perceptions of judicial independence and damage the High Court as an institution. While the debates that dogged Barwick, Murphy, and their places on the Court, are perhaps intimately connected to their own idiosyncrasies, in other respects the problems they brought to the bench predate those issues, stemming from their careers as politicians.
Having explored these two cases, we then shift tack, examining the process of judicial appointment to the High Court of Australia, asking whether Brandis or a future AttorneyGeneral could appoint themselves to the Court. We note that the extremely limited criteria for, and strict executive control over, appointments, leaves Australia increasingly isolated globally. More significantly however, as was made painfully clear recently in Queensland, 7 leaving appointment entirely in the hands of the executive carries risks that an appointee may once again shake public faith in the Court.
Sir Garfield Barwick: The course upon which Your Excellency has determined …
The penultimate Commonwealth Attorney-General appointed to the High Court of Australia was the Honourable Sir Garfield Edward John Barwick, 8 taking over as Chief Justice on 1
May 1964 following the retirement of Sir Owen Dixon. Having served under Liberal Prime
Minister Sir Robert Menzies since 1958, the conservative Barwick reportedly remarked that no current barristers or jurists could replace Dixon, and that '"only the two of us, Menzies and myself" might meet the requirement'. 9 Perhaps the most contentious role he ever played was as Chief Justice, contributing advice on a 'non-justiciable' matter to Governor-General While a constitutional crisis similar to the dismissal may never again occur thanks to this policy, informal rules may not be sufficient to preclude another partisan from dragging the High Court back into the disrepute of polarising politics. The possibility of another AttorneyGeneral being appointed to the High Court remains entirely viable, and the potential for that appointee to conflict on contentious matters the ruling government is perhaps heightened in our current political culture where political leadership is prone to unprecedented turnover.
Despite the argument that our judicial and political cultures are now substantially different to the 1970s, a sufficiently motivated government, under public pressure or requiring an expedient reshuffle, may find it useful to readopt this kind of appointment and subject the High Court to a comparable controversy once more. Of course, appointing a politician (or Attorney-General) is not prima facie problematic but better oversight mechanisms are required. Particularly, given that Barwick is defended to this day, a future justice with both a similar legal pedigree and party connections could reasonably point to his behaviour as their own precedent to justify controversy. that the Attorney-General listen to their state counterparts, and there is no statement of criteria against which to assess candidates.
Lionel Murphy and his 'little mate'
Reflecting on the limited statutory constraints, Gabrielle Appleby has noted that it is 'inevitable' that politics will infiltrate the appointment process. 49 To some degree this is positive. As James Allen has remarked, the executive's wide scope ensures some minimal level of democratic accountability is maintained over judicial appointments. 50 However, in light of the dangers of partisanship, and developments internationally, the extremely broad discretionary powers granted to Australian federal Attorneys General in the appointment of judges, is difficult to maintain. 51 Indeed, Australia appears increasingly isolated.
In August 2016, Canada revamped its federal judicial appointment process by establishing an independent and non-partisan advisory appointments board, tasked with identifying suitable candidates, and increasing transparency around nominations. Most significantly, instead of relying on the 'judicial whisper', 52 candidates seeking a federal judicial appointment must submit an application, which is then considered by the Advisory Board.
The Advisory Board is composed of seven members, four of whom are nominated by independent professional organisations. These seven members review the candidate applications and submit a shortlist of three to five individuals for consideration by the Prime
Minister. This new process is designed to enhance the integrity of the Supreme Court by increasing transparency in the appointments process. As such:
the assessment criteria guiding the Advisory Board, the questionnaire that all applicants must answer, and certain answers provided to the questionnaire by the Prime Minister's eventual nominee, will all be made public. 
Conclusion
The processes in Canada, the UK and South Africa all maintain the same minimum level of democratic accountability that exists under our arrangement. They also all ensure that the final decision is made by the government of the day. What distinguishes them, however, is the emphasis on transparency and accountability. These processes do not prevent a politician, or in Justice Rowe's case -an individual who has benefited from the patronage of one particular party -from being appointed to the bench, but in providing a layer of scrutiny and transparency that does not exist in Australia they ensure that the independence of the 
